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Abstract 
Using international listed banks from the United States, Europe, Japan and China from 2004 
to 2014, we analyse the effect on bank risk of some of the most relevant new elements of 
the prudential regulatory framework proposed in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis. We 
measure risk by a market measure, namely the volatility of banks’ stock returns. We also 
examine the effect of government support during the financial crisis and of designation as a 
G-SIB. We find little support for an association with government support and none for 
a negative relationship. We find support for a positive effect of designation as a G-SIB on 
risk. We find a positive association with securities trading and a negative association with 
capital. Banks’ chosen liquidity is unimportant for this measure of risk. 
Keywords: banks, regulation, financial crisis. 





Utilizando una muestra de bancos cotizados de Estados Unidos, Europa, Japón y China 
durante el período 2004-2014, los autores analizan el impacto que el nuevo marco de 
regulación prudencial aprobado en el G-20 tras la gran crisis financiera tiene sobre el riesgo 
bancario. El riesgo se mide en función de la volatilidad de la cotización de los bancos. Los 
autores analizan también cómo influyeron las recapitalizaciones públicas durante la crisis así 
como la designación de G-SIB (banco de importancia sistémica global). Se llega a la 
conclusión de que hay evidencia que demuestra el impacto positivo que la designación de 
G-SIB tiene sobre el riesgo. No hay evidencia de una relación negativa entre riesgo y 
capitalización pública y sí de la relación positiva entre riesgo y actividad de negociación de 
valores. Los niveles de capital más altos reducen el riesgo, mientras que la liquidez no afecta 
de manera significativa al riesgo. 
Palabras clave: bancos, regulación y crisis financiera. 
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1 Introduction 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 highlighted the weaknesses of the international regulatory 
architecture and was followed by a coordinated response by the G-20 countries represented at 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB committed to improving financial regulation by 
implementing a major program of financial reforms with clear principles and timetables (FSB, 
2009a). The stated objectives are to create a financial system that better supports balanced 
economic growth and limits moral hazard by institutions that are Too Big to Fail (TBTF). A large 
literature concludes that countries with better developed financial systems, particularly with 
efficient banks and well organized and smoothly functioning stock markets, tend to grow faster 
(Levine, Loyola and Beck, 2000).   
The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the likely effects of two aspects of 
government interventions – prudential regulation and government financial support – on the 
market’s perception of banks’ riskiness.1 We use realized volatility as the empirical measure of 
ex post risk. This measure of risk can be interpreted as expected risk plus unexpected risk. It 
can be written 	ߪ௧ ൌ ܧሺߪ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௧, where ߪ௧ is the standard deviation of returns, ܧሺߪ௧ሻ is the 
expected standard deviation of daily returns conditional on information available before	ݐ, and 
ߝ௧ is the unexpected part of the standard deviation. The major effect of using realized volatility 
as a measure of risk compared to expected risk is a lessening of the R2 of the estimated 
regressions.2 
The effects of some interventions such as bailouts can be examined based on the 
effects of past bailouts. The actual effects of some regulations cannot be estimated for some 
time precisely because they were not implemented during our study period. On the other hand, 
the regulations are being drafted with certain intended purposes and it is useful to know 
whether evidence from banks’ behaviour is consistent with the regulations possibly having the 
intended effects. 
Our empirical analysis covers the eleven years from 2004 through 2014. This period 
includes three years before the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and six years after the crisis. 
The government interventions and regulatory measures examined in this period include: 
— Government support through capital injections during and after the financial crisis. 
One part of our contribution is our analysis of the effect on realized volatility of 
both prudential regulatory actions and government financial support. In all 
instances, capital injections took place in the context of well-defined government 
programs for which all national banks were eligible. 
— Financial Stability Board (FSB) designation of Globally Systemic Important Banks. 
The FSB has been publishing a list of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) 
following BIS methodology since 2011. This is part of the G-20 actions aimed at 
reducing moral hazard associated with institutions that are TBTF and is a prudential 
regulation which has been put into practice. Table 1 shows the banks designated as 
G-SIBs from the first designation in 2011 until 2014 when our data end. 
                                                                          
1 The optimal tradeoff between risk and stability is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2 MacAleer and Medeiros (2008) provide an excellent review of the literature on realized volatility and references. 
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— Limitations on securities trading including limits on proprietary trading. The 
Fundamental Review of the Trading Book revised the minimum capital for market 
risk and, in parallel, is attempting to ring fence trading activities.3  
— Requirement of an overall leverage ratio. Regulation is being revised to introduce 
an internationally harmonized capital leverage ratio in addition to a risk-based 
capital ratio.4 
— Liquidity standards. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requires that banks have 
liquid assets which cover 100% or more of net cash outflows over a 30 day 
period. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requires that a minimum percentage 
of capital and long term liabilities provide a reliable source of funding for lending 
over one year.5 We use two ratios of banks´ liquidity provided by Bankscope that 
measure, respectively, short term liquidity and the stability of sources of funding of 
bank lending. Bankscope does not provide information on the maturities of assets 
and liabilities or estimated outflow rates for assets; therefore, the variables cannot 
reflect these aspects of the regulations.  
 
Our results indicate that capital injections by governments during the financial crisis 
are not associated with higher or lower risk. Banks designated as G-SIBs are regarded as 
riskier than other banks. Our results indicate that banks with larger trading books are perceived 
to be riskier. We find that a higher leverage ratio – capital relative to assets – is associated with 
banks having less risk as perceived by the market. There is little evidence of an association 
between banks´ chosen liquidity ratios and banks’ riskiness. 
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 presents the 
relevant literature as well as the hypotheses to be tested in this paper. Our empirical approach 
and the variables included in the analysis are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents our 
data and some univariate analysis and section 5 analyses the regression results. Section 6 
presents a difference-in-difference analysis to provide additional evidence on the association of 
realized volatility with government support and designation as a G-SIB. The last section 
concludes. 
                                                                          
3 In the United States, this is known as the Volcker Rule. At the time of writing this paper, the EU has abandoned the 
proposed separation of trading activities including proprietary trading from the traditional deposit taking activities. 
In the UK, the Prudential Supervisory Authority has recently published rules implementing the ring fencing of core UK 
financial services, which will become effective on January 1, 2019 (see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/ 
Documents/publications/ps/2017/ps317app1.pdf accessed 6th June, 2017). In the United States, the ban on banks´ 
proprietary trading became effective in July, 2015 although revisions are in progress. 
4 On November 23, 2016, the EU Commission proposed a package of regulatory reforms which included the 
introduction of a required leverage ratio of 3% of Tier 1 which was announced in 2015 and is expected to be fully 
implemented in 2019. This is in line with the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors’ timetable for internationally 
active banks (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm accessed 6th June, 2017). 
5 The LCR will was fully implemented January 1, 2018 and the NSFR (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs274.htm 
accessed 6, June, 2017) will enter into force by 2019 (see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm accessed 6th 
June, 2017). 
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2 Literature review and testable implications  
The various studies that we review in this section focus on the effect on different measures of 
bank risk and performance of prudential regulation of capital, liquidity or both in addition to 
government capital injections into banks. To our knowledge, only Berger et al. (forthcoming) 
explore the simultaneous effect of prudential regulatory actions and government financial 
support on banks’ riskiness. They provide substantial evidence that both sorts of interventions 
decrease banks’ risk taking. Their study differs from ours in several important ways. Berger et 
al. (forthcoming) use a regulatory accounting measure of bank risk – risk weighted assets over 
total assets – while we use the realized volatility of stock returns as a measure of risk. 
Regulatory interventions in Berger et al. (forthcoming) are specific actions taken by regulators, 
such as dismissing executives, levying fines, issuing cease-and-desist orders but not broad 
interventions and prudential regulatory requirements as in our analysis. We focus on some of 
the most relevant new elements of the prudential regulatory framework proposed after the 
crisis. We include structural prudential measures such as classification as a G-SIB and banks’ 
characteristics such as their holdings of trading securities. We also examine government capital 
injections in 2007 and 2008. Their empirical results are based exclusively on German banks, 
and we examine an international sample of listed banks.  
Following the review of the literature, we summarize hypotheses for our estimates of 
the effects of government interventions on banks´ risk.  
2.1 Effect of government financial support and designation as a G-SIB 
Diamond and Rajan (2005) develop a theoretical model in which recapitalizing failing banks can 
have negative effects on banks which are experiencing no difficulties. On the other hand, 
liquidity injections have no negative effect on banks with no difficulties but might be ineffective 
at salvaging troubled banks. 
Garcia-Palacios et al. (2014) use a relatively standard Diamond-Dybvig style theoretical 
model to analyze the efficiency of recapitalization programs and taxes on early withdrawals at 
preventing financial turmoil. These measures have costs. Taxes on early withdrawals penalize 
agents facing liquidity shocks and recapitalization programs require higher taxes for the same 
level of government expenditures besides recapitalization. They show that when agents value 
public services, taxes on early withdrawals can be the best policy. On the other hand, 
recapitalization programs are preferred when there is little value placed on public goods.  
We focus on the most recent empirical studies of the interventions in the recent crisis. 
Using a sample of European, U.S. and Asian banks from 2008 to 2010, Fratianni and 
Marchionne (2013) find that announcements of general public support in the United States 
were followed by positive abnormal returns and lower volatility of returns. Government rescue 
plans for individual banks were associated with negative abnormal returns and higher volatility 
of returns. This finding might reflect the intervention being a revelation of previously unknown 
financial difficulty. They also find, though, that their empirical results are sensitive to the 
econometric techniques to deal with the time-series and cross-section econometric issues. 
Elyasiani et al. (2014) also examine the effect on stock returns of large capital 
injections into U.S. banks by the U.S. government. They conclude that banks’ common stock 
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returns reacted positively to TARP bank capital injections in the short term, in contrast to the 
typical negative response to seasoned equity offerings. 
Using an accounting measure of banks´ risk – Z Score – and 23 banking crises from 
23 mostly developing countries, Hryckiewicz (2014) concludes that interventions increase the 
riskiness of banks.6 The overall effect varies with the structure of the bailout program but 
nationalizations, blanket guarantees and restructuring vehicles such as “bad banks” are 
associated with higher risk. These results are robust to various modifications including risk 
measures, time periods and countries’ characteristics. 
Banks designated as systemic can receive an implicit subsidy due to the expectation 
of government support of TBTF banks when they encounter financial difficulties. Afonso et al.  
(2014) and Marques et al. (2013) provide evidence that heightened perceptions that a bank is 
TBTF result in the bank increasing its riskiness. The empirical literature typically focuses on the 
effect on riskiness of marginal changes in the probability of government support. The IMF 
(2014, p. 118, Table 3.1) provides a set of estimates based on the rating gain associated with 
government support. This rating gain is translated into a lower credit spread using the historical 
relationship between credit ratings and bond spreads. They find that decreases in credit 
spreads for G-SIBs are around 60 basis points (bps) for banks in the Eurozone, around 25 bps 
for Japanese banks, around 20 bps for British banks and around 15 bps for U.S. banks. 
Except in the Eurozone, the rating gains are larger for distressed G-SIBs.7  
Since the recent financial crisis, international prudential regulators have focused on a 
common definition of Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and a set of well-defined policy 
actions aimed at limiting both the probability and costs of these banks’ failures (Kaufman, 
2014). We are not aware of any studies which have examined the effect of designation as a G-
SIB on the market’s perception of a bank’s risk. 
2.2 Effects of capital and liquidity regulation 
The starting point in assessing the effect of banking regulation is assessing its effect in 
mitigating or eliminating banking crises. There is a vast literature on capital regulation especially 
and we focus only on papers closely related to Basel III. Since the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, liquidity has received quite a bit of attention by researchers as well as regulators. 
Allen et al. (2012) analyze Basel III’s provisions in detail and argue that higher capital 
and liquidity buffers can be consistent with more financial stability. 
Focusing on the Basel III leverage ratio, Kiema and Jokivuolle (2014) study the effects 
of a required leverage capital ratio on lending strategies in a calibrated theoretical model of a 
banking system with banks specializing in high-risk and low-risk loans. They show that too low 
a required leverage ratio combined with model risk actually can increase bank failures because 
more banks make high-risk loans. 
Papanikolau and Wolff (2014) examine the 20 largest U.S. banks before and after the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. They measure the banks’ riskiness by realized volatility, the 
quarterly standard deviation of the banks’ daily stock returns. Among other things, they find 
that off-balance sheet items increased banks’ riskiness before the crisis. They suggest that 
                                                                          
6 The z-score is the sum of the average return on assets plus the ratio of equity capital to assets, both divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets. 
7 The decreases in credit spreads for distressed G-SIBS are around 75 bps in Japan, Great Britain and the United 
States. 
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leverage requirements should reflect these off-balance-sheet assets as well as on-balance-
sheet items. Bitar et al. (forthcoming) examine OECD banks to estimate the effects of capital 
regulation on banks’ riskiness, profitability and efficiency. They measure risk by loan loss 
reserves relative to assets, to total loans and to impaired loans. They find that risk-weighted 
capital is not related to these measures of risk but that non-risk-weighted capital is positively 
related to loan loss reserves. They interpret this as reflecting a “higher precautionary reserve 
policy” (Bitar et al. forthcoming, p. 15). 
Tirole (2011) applies his general theoretical analyses of liquidity to summarize issues 
concerning liquidity and the implications for interpreting the crisis and regulation. He points out 
that much is not known including whether the banks’ liquidity is too low, too high or about right 
relative to some ideal. Goodhart (2008) discusses general issues that arise when central banks 
attempt to regulate liquidity. Walther (2015) develops a theoretical framework in which 
macroprudential regulation in terms of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is beneficial when 
implemented jointly with micro-prudential regulation. 
In a theoretical analysis, Allen and Gale (2004) conclude that banks’ liquidity creation 
can increase their exposure to risk because banks’ losses increase with the level of illiquid 
assets to satisfy depositors’ redemptions. On a different line, Myers and Rajan (1998) and 
Morgan (2002) argue that more liquid banks can engage in trading activities that are are more 
opaque and therefore more difficult to monitor.  
Empirical research on liquidity today inevitably is based on data from a period in which 
there is no direct regulation of liquidity as is contemplated in Basel III. Any implications for policy 
must be tempered by the knowledge that the variables are measured in one policy regime; a 
new policy regime with liquidity regulation can change those relationships. This is just an 
application of the Lucas Critique to what are at best reduced-form estimated relationships 
(Lucas 1976). This problem is compounded by the fact that required liquidity is not the same 
thing as banks’ freely chosen liquidity. Just as Friedman emphasized for required reserve ratios 
(Friedman 1959, p. 46), required liquidity cannot be used absent a decrease in the denominator 
of the required liquidity ratio.8 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2013) provide empirical evidence that liquidity risk 
management, in addition to the asset quality and credit risk of a bank, is associated with the 
probability of default. Using two measures of liquidity risk and two of credit risk for U.S. banks 
from 1998 to 2010, they find that banks with higher credit risk and higher liquidity risk have 
higher probabilities of default. Curiously, they also find that the interaction of credit risk and 
liquidity risk increases the probability of default when that probability is low but decreases the 
probability of default when the probability of default is high. 
Distinguin et al. (2013) find that banks decrease their regulatory capital when they 
have less liquidity as defined by the Basel III accord. This evidence is for publicly traded banks 
in the United States and Europe from 2000 to 2006. They also find that small banks behave 
differently in some respects, increasing regulatory capital when core deposits decrease. 
                                                                          
8 Goodhart (2008, p. 41) makes this point nicely: The most salient metaphor and fable in prudential regulation is of the 
weary traveller who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his delight, sees a taxi there who could take him 
to his distant destination. He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require 
that there must always be one taxi standing ready at the station. Required liquidity is not true, usable liquidity. Nor 
might I add, is required minimum capital fully usable capital from the point of view of a bank. 
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Hong at al. (2014) examine the effects of the Basel III liquidity requirements on U.S. 
banks. They distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic liquidity risks and find that both 
have limited effects on bank failures even though liquidity problems are a major contributor to 
bank failures in 2009 and 2010. In contrast, King (2013) focuses on the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio, NSFR, using a sample of banks in 15 countries and shows that the required NSFR is 
associated with lower net interest margins at banks.  
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3 Empirical approach 
Table 2 summarizes the hypothesis to be tested in our model and the expected signs of the 
coefficients in light of the literature. 
We present two sets of regressions to test the hypotheses for two time periods. Four 
regressions are presented for the entire period 2004 to 2014 and three are presented for the 
post-crisis period 2008 to 2014. The dependent variable in all these regressions is the natural 
logarithm of the realized volatility of banks’ stock returns. A bank’s realized volatility of its stock 
return can be interpreted as an ex post measure of the market’s perception of a bank’s risk 
and a noisy measure of the ex ante risk. For each bank-year pair, we use daily stock returns to 
compute the standard deviation for six months after the closing date for financial statements. 
For example, if a bank’s accounting year ends on December 31, 2010, we calculate the 
standard deviation of its daily stock returns using daily returns from January 2011 through June 
2011.9 The standard deviation of stock returns for bank i at date t is denoted ߪ௜,௧. We match 
this variable with accounting variables for the date, 2010 in the previous example, and market 
realized volatility for the same time period as the bank’s returns. 
The explanatory variables are: 
Government Support: Based on BIS data, we include a dummy variable that equals 
one if a bank received a capital injection during the financial crisis and zero otherwise. 
Globally Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB): The dummy variable for G-SIBs is one if 
a bank is classified as a G-SIB by the FSB in the corresponding year and zero otherwise. This 
measure of systemic importance reflects not only size but also interconnectedness, 
substitutability, complexity and cross jurisdictional activity.10 The first list was released in 2011, 
and it has been updated every November since. Table 1 shows the banks designated as  
G-SIBs for each year. For years before 2011, we set this dummy variable equal to zero. 
Logarithm of Trading Securities to Total Assets (trading assets): We use the ratio of 
trading securities to total assets as a measure of a bank’s securities trading activity. This 
number includes all assets and securities classified as held for trading whether for market 
making or for proprietary trading. The assets and securities are measured at fair value and 
derivatives are not included in the total.11 
Logarithm of Leverage Ratio (leverage ratio): The leverage ratio as defined in the Basel 
III framework, which measures bank capitalization.12 For IFRS banks, the ratio in percentage 
terms is 
100 x (Equity / Total assets including off-balance sheet items) 
                                                                          
9 This will be labelled as the standard deviation for the year 2010. Hryckiewicz (2014) uses four-year moving averages. 
10 See BCBS (2014 and 2017) for the assessment methodology (http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d296.pdf and 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/) accessed 27th November, 2017. 
11 Because many banks have no trading securities, we add 1 to the ratio for all banks before computing the natural 
logarithm of this ratio.  
12 Our measure of off balance sheet items is an approximation to the Basel III definition of “exposure measure.” It should 
be noted that in Dec 2014 the definition of the leverage ratio exposure measure was revised by introducing changes 
(e.g. differentiated Credit Conversion Factors for off-balance sheet items, netting of SFTs and recognition of cash 
variation margin for derivatives). 
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For U.S.-GAAP banks, the ratio in percentage terms is 
100 x (Equity / (Total assets + off balance sheet items) 
Equity includes common equity, non-controlling interest shares and revaluation reserves. 
Logarithm of Liquid Assets to Customer & Short Term Funding (liquidity coverage): 
This variable measures short term liquidity at banks. A higher ratio implies a higher level of 
liquidity. The ratio in percentage terms is measured as: 
Liquid assets100x .Customer and short-term funding
 
Liquid assets include cash, government bonds and short-term claims on other banks. 
This is a narrower definition of high-quality liquid assets than the Basel III definition of the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which also includes other assets such as corporate bonds and 
covered bonds.13 Customer and short-term funding is estimated by total customer deposits, 
deposits from banks, other deposits and short-term borrowings as defined by Bankscope. 
Differences in outflow rates are ignored due to a lack of data.14 As for the LCR, a higher 
percentage of Liquid Assets to Customer & Short Term Funding is assumed to be associated 
with more liquidity and less vulnerablity to a run.  
Logarithm of Total Deposits & Borrowings over Net Loans (stable funding): This 
second measure of banks´ liquidity reflects the stability of the financing of banks´ lending. It is a 
measure of the net stable funding ratio: the higher the ratio, the higher liquidity. This ratio in 
percentage terms is measured as:  
Customer and short-term funding  Other funding  Hybrid capital –  Subordinated debt100 x .Loans
   
Loans include retail, corporate, mortgage and commercial loans, as well as reserves 
against possible losses on impaired loans. This is a narrower definition than Basel III’s definition 
of the denominator of the required net stable funding ratio (NSFR), which also includes trade 
finance, derivatives, securitizations and covered bonds and is weighted according to the 
stability of the financing needs.15 Our sources of funding are broadly in line with the definition of 
available stable funding in the Basel III’s definition of NSFR. They include Deposits and 
Borrowings which are part of that stable funding as well as other funding which is capital 
market funding not otherwise categorized. Hybrid capital includes preference shares and 
premium (additional paid in capital in excess of par value) as well as redeemable capital in 
cooperative banks. Subordinated debt includes all possible maturities for this type of debt. 
Sources of financing are not weighted according to the assumed stability of these sources of 
funding, which they are in the NSFR.  
The logarithms of these ratios are included in the regressions. 
                                                                          
13 The LCR also includes other assets such as corporate bonds and covered bonds in liquid assets. The LCR = High 
Quality Liquid Assets / Net cash outflows ≥ 100% (30 days). There are substantial haircuts for some securities included 
as liquid assets. 
14  Outflow rates depend on the counterparties in addition to features of the deposits. 
15 NSFR = Available stable funding ratio / required stable funds ≥ 100% (< 1 yr). 
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We also include, as controls, the following variables which are likely to be associated 
with the volatility of banks’ stock returns for other reasons: 
Logarithm of Total Assets (Assets): Total assets measure a bank’s size. For banks 
reporting the information using U.S.-GAAP, we add their corresponding “Off Balance Sheet 
Items” to the reported total assets. 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA): This ratio in percentage terms is 100 times net 
income over average total assets. ROAA shows banks´ profitability measured by the net 
income generated from the total average assets available to the bank. Average assets are the 
arithmetic mean of the values at the end of years t and t-1. “Net income” includes operating 
and non-operating profit, non-recurring income (expenses) and other non-operating income 
(expenses) net of taxes. 
Logarithm of beta-adjusted standard deviation of the market return (ሺ|ߚ௜|ߪ௠ሻ and 
|Beta| x Market’s realized volatility): The volatility of individual stocks’ returns depends on the 
market volatility multiplied by the absolute value of the beta for the individual stock.  
The relationship between a bank’s volatility and the market volatility depends on the beta in the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and any other model of volatility that includes the market return as 
a risk factor with coefficients that vary across firms.16 We estimated average betas for each 
bank over all the data from 2004 to 2014. While betas estimated for investment purposes 
varied over this long time period, we are attempting to measure a bank’s typical sensitivity to 
market volatility. Using an average for the overall period attenuates any issues generated by 
using estimated betas on the right-hand side of the regression (Pagan 1984).17 We use the 
absolute value of the beta for the bank multiplied by the standard deviation of the market return 
for the country in which a bank is headquartered. The timing of the market standard deviation 
is the same as for the dependent variable. 
Real GDP growth rate  cy : We include the annual growth rate of real GDP from year 
t-1 to t for country c in which a bank’s headquarter is located. This information is from the 
World Bank and World Development Indicators.  
Pre-crisis dummy variable: This dummy variable takes the value one from 2004 to 
2007 and zero otherwise. It is used to examine changes in coefficients before and after the 
financial crisis. 
Leverage  3% dummy variable (leverage ratio  3%): This dummy variable takes the 
value one if a bank leverage’s ratio is greater than or equal to 3%, which is the minimum 
regulatory requirement.  
As mentioned above, we estimate seven panel regressions. All regressions include 
fixed effects for each year and each bank. 
The baseline regression includes only the explanatory and control variables to assess 
their relationship with the market’s perception of overall bank. The basic equation is  
                                                                          
16 We are grateful to an audience member at the Infiniti conference for pointing this out. 
17 It would be difficult at best to come up with convincing instrumental variables for beta. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1829 
   
 
     
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
 
           
          l | |  3
           
i ii i
i i i
i i i m c i i
government support G - SIB trading
leverage liquidity stable funding
assets ROAA y pre crisis leverage ratio
fixed eff
    
  
       
   
  
        
   iects 
  
We omit the subscripts for time period from the equation above for simplicity; all 
variables are measured in the same time period as the dependent variable. All variables are 
measured in logarithms except the dummy variables (government support, G-SIB, pre-crisis 
and  3%leverage ratio  ), ROAA and .cy  Fixed effects for each year and each bank are 
included in all equations. The estimated parameters are given by and .i   The error term is .i  
The other three regressions for 2004 to 2014 are variants of this basic equation in 
which dummy variables are interacted with the financial variables. We define the “financial 
variables” as trading assets, leverage ratio, liquidity coverage and stable funding.  
The second regression includes interactions between the financial variables and the G-
SIB dummy variable. This regression makes it possible to assess whether variables have 
different effects for G-SIBs and other banks. 
The third regression includes interactions between the financial variables and the 
government support dummy variable. This regression examines whether government capital 
support is associated with different effects of the financial variables: 
The fourth regression includes interactions between the financial variables and the pre-
crisis dummy variable. This regression examines whether there is a different effect of these 
financial variables on banks’ risk before 2008 compared to later years.	
We also run the regressions using only data for 2008 to 2014, the post-crisis period. 
While the fourth regression for the whole period permits shifts in the estimated coefficients of 
the financial variables by time period, these three regressions permit shifts in all coefficients and 
in the standard errors of the residuals in the regressions. 
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4 Data and descriptive analysis  
4.1 Set of banks selected  
The data include international, listed banks in the United States, Europe, Japan and China with 
financial information available in Bankscope. The data include 881 listed banks from 39 
countries. Table 3 shows the number of banks for each country and year between 2004 and 
2014. As shown in Table 3, some banks disappear between 2004 and 2014 and some new 
ones appear. Also, some explanatory variables are not available for all periods. For this reason, 
our dataset is an unbalanced panel with 5,630 bank-year observations. The data span the 
eleven years from 2004, the year of the adoption of the “International Financial Reporting 
Standards” (IFRS), to 2014, the last year with complete financial information when we started 
this research. Financial data are reported under IFRS for the non-U.S. banks. Financial data are 
reported under “General Accepted Accounting Principles” (GAAP) for most U.S. banks and we 
include financial data of U.S. banks using GAAP.18  
Banks in this sample can be classified as bank holding companies, commercial and 
savings banks, investment and private banks, and mortgage and real estate banks. 
The government interventions and regulatory measures examined in this paper include: 
— Government support through capital injections.  
— FSB designation of G SIBs.  
— Limitations on securities trading including limits on proprietary trading. The 
Fundamental Review of the Trading Book revised the minimum capital for market 
risk and, in parallel, is attempting to ring fence trading activities.19  
— Requirement of a capital leverage ratio.20 
— Liquidity requirements.21 
 
We use data on stock prices from Datastream to estimate each bank’s realized 
volatilities and beta.22 Some banks have estimated betas less than -2 or greater than 2 and are 
not included in our final dataset.23 Figure 1 shows the density of the distribution of estimated 
betas used for our computations.24 Our data on ex post government support refers exclusively 
to capital injections in banks from 2004 to 2014 (actually 2008 to 2010) and is from the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). 
                                                                          
18 We choose consolidated over unconsolidated accounting statements when possible. 
19 In the United States, this is known as the Volcker Rule. At the time of writing this paper, the EU has abandoned the 
proposed separation of trading activities including proprietary trading from the traditional deposit taking activities. In the 
UK, the Prudential Supervisory Authority has recently published rules implementing the ring fencing of core UK financial 
services, which will become effective on January 1, 2019 (see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/ 
publications/ps/2017/ps317app1.pdf accessed 6th June, 2017). In the United States, the ban on banks´ proprietary 
trading became effective in July, 2015.   
20 On November 23rd 2016, the EU Commission proposed a package of regulatory reforms which included the 
introduction of a required banks´ leverage ratio of 3% of Tier 1 capital. This had been discussed since 2015 and is 
expected to be fully implemented in 2019. This is inline with the timetable of the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervisors for internationally active banks (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm accessed 6th June, 2017). 
21 LCR will be fully implemented January 1, 2018 and the NSFR (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs274.htm accessed 
June 6, 2017) will enter into force by 2019 (see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm accessed June 6, 2017). 
22  We use banks’ International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) and ticker symbols to match these sources of data. 
23 A total of 125 observations were deleted. There were 353 remaining bank-year observations with negative betas, out 
of 5,630 observations. If the negative estimates are due to estimation error, they have less effect than it might seem at 
first because the regression includes the absolute value of the beta. 
24 Our betas are estimated using the market index for the country in which the bank is headquartered as the measure of 
the market return. 
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Table 4 presents summary statistics for the variables included in our analysis. All of the 
variables are measured in natural units even though the logarithms of many of the variables are 
included in the regressions. 
4.2 Descriptive analysis of the data 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix among the variables. Although not an entirely reliable 
guide to multicollinearity, the correlations do not show any extremely high correlations among 
the variables. No correlation of right-hand side variables exceeds the partly mechanical 
correlation of 0.49 between the leverage ratio and the dummy variable for leverage ratios of 3 
percent or more. 
Table 6 shows the coefficients for univariate regressions of the logarithm of volatility on 
the variables and their statistical significance. Government support is associated with higher 
volatility and designation as a G-SIB is associated with lower volatility. Larger banks also have 
lower volatility, which could be consistent with larger banks simply having lower perceived 
volatility rather than the importance of designation as a G-SIB. Of the financial ratios, having 
more trading assets is associated with less perceived volatility and riskiness, contrary to the 
regulatory argument of limiting this activity. A higher capitalization measured in terms of the 
leverage ratio is associated with lower volatility, which is consistent with the regulatory 
requirement of higher capital leverage ratios. A capital leverage ratio greater than or equal to 
three percent also is associated with lower volatility, although the independent contribution of 
these two functions of the leverage ratio is not immediately obvious. Liquidity coverage is not 
reliably associated with volatility, while stable funding is only marginally associated with lower 
volatility, at least in these univariate regressions.  
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5 Regression analysis 
Table 7 presents the results for the full period, 2004 to 2014. All of the multivariate regressions 
include both bank and year fixed effects which control for any unobserved constant bank 
characteristics or effects associated with years which might affect the volatility of banks’ stock 
returns.25 Table 9 presents the results for the post crisis period (2008-2014). Tables 8 and 10 
present associated estimates and p-values for testing for differences in the estimated 
coefficients for sub-groups or different time period. 
5.1 Determinants of banks’ stock-return risk 
Government support of banks generally is positively associated with the market’s perception of 
a bank’s risk in the four regressions in Table 7 but also generally is not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, designation as a G-SIB is statistically significant in the baseline regression 
and is statistically significant in two of the three regressions allowing for interaction effects. 26 In 
the baseline regression, the estimate is not trivial, with a 33 percent increase in volatility if a 
bank is designated as a G-SIB. 
Of the financial variables that are the subject of regulatory changes, trading assets is 
uniformly positively related to realized volatility of stock returns and the effects are substantial. A 
ten percent increase in the ratio of trading assets to total bank assets increases realized 
volatility by 13 to 22 percent depending on the specification.27 The leverage ratio is uniformly 
negatively related to realized volatility of stock returns. A ten percent increase in the leverage 
ratio reduces realized volatility by about four percent. These results are consistent with the 
proposition that banks holding more trading securities and presumably trading more are riskier. 
They also are consistent with the proposition that banks with less capital are riskier. Neither the 
liquidity coverage nor stable funding ratios are statistically significant in the baseline regression. 
Only the stable funding ratio is statistically significant at the ten percent significance level in one 
of the four regressions. 
Banks with higher ROAAs are less risky. Banks with higher risk premia as indicated by 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model are riskier. Leverage ratios of three percent or more are 
associated with less risk, although the relationship is not statistically significant. Real GDP 
growth is unimportant for the riskiness of bank’s returns in all four regressions. This could 
reflect a variety of factors including the international operations of many banks and therefore 
the unimportance of real GDP growth in the country in which a bank is headquartered. 
5.2 Interaction effects between financial variables on banks’ stock-return risk 
Table 8 presents information for testing whether or not the interaction effects in Table 7 are 
statistically significant. Table 8 also presents the estimated coefficients for the sub-group under 
consideration. There is a direct effect of being a G-SIB on riskiness, but there is only a little bit 
of evidence that the G-SIBs have a different relationship between the financial variables and 
riskiness. The p-value for testing the hypothesis that the coefficient of the stable funding ratio is 
zero for G-SIBs is 4.6 percent, marginally statistically significant at the five percent significance 
                                                                          
25 To examine collinearity, we computed Variance Inflation Factors that quantify how much a coefficient’s variance 
increases due to multicollinearity. None of the Variance Inflation Factors is above 2, which suggests that 
multicollinearity is unimportant. 
26 We estimated the baseline regression without bank’s sizes and obtained similar results with the effect of being 
designated a G-SIB still unimportant. 
27 The regressions include the logarithms of these variables and therefore these changes are approximately percentage 
changes relative to the level before the change.  
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level. That said, as a block, a test whether all four financial variables have the same coefficients 
for G-SIBs and other banks is consistent with the data at the 20.8 percent significance level. Of 
the three interaction effects, only the government support dummy variable comes close to 
being statistically significant, with a p-value for the four different coefficients of 6.7 percent. 
There is some suggestive evidence of differences particularly for leverage suggesting that 
banks with lower capitalization that receive public support have higher volatility but there is not 
overwhelming support for the differences. The coefficients for the pre-crisis dummy variable 
also have statistically significant coefficients for leverage and a liquidity variable, the liquidity 
coverage variable, but the overall test for different coefficients has a p-value of 0.786. 
5.3 Estimates for the post crisis period, 2008 to 2014 
Table 9 presents results using only data for the period after the crisis (2008 to 2014). Table 10 
shows that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients of the financial 
variables for G-SIBs and other banks. Similarly, one cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients for financial variables for banks that received government support and for other 
banks. 
Given these results in Table 10, we focus on the baseline regression in Table 9. The 
baseline regression indicates that government support is associated with higher realized 
volatility in the aftermath of the crisis. Also, trading assets are associated with higher realized 
volatility and the estimated coefficient is even larger than for the whole period. Designation as a 
G-SIB is important only if different coefficients are estimated for G-SIBs and the magnitude of 
the coefficient is extraordinarily large. 
As a robustness test, we modified the dependent variable by computing stock returns’ 
volatilities using three months after accounting statements’ closing dates. The variables which 
are statistically significant are almost the same.28 
                                                                          
28 These tables are available upon request.  
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6 Government support and designation as a G-SIB 
Higher realized volatility may be the reason for government support or for a bank being 
designated a G-SIB.29 Realized volatility is measured after the right-hand-side variables are 
determined though and all the regressions include dummy variables for each bank which will 
reflect any constant differences in realized volatility and other variables. Every regression 
includes dummy variables for individual banks. Still, it is possible that the positive association of 
realized volatility with either designation as a G-SIB or government support is due to an effect 
of volatility on designation as a G-SIB or on receiving government support. In addition to that 
issue, the results for government support and designation as a G-SIB are ambiguous. For the 
whole period, it appears that designation as a G-SIB is important but not government support. 
For the period after the financial crisis, designation as a G-SIB does not appear so important 
but government support definitely is important. 
To provide some additional evidence on this issue, we perform a univariate “difference 
in difference” analysis for the period 2004-2014. This analysis compares changes in volatility 
across “treated” and “untreated” groups. In our case, we compare the subsequent changes in 
volatility for banks that received government support during the financial crisis compared to the 
change in volatility for banks that did not receive government support. We also examine  
the subsequent change in volatility for banks designated G-SIBs compared to the change in 
volatility for banks not so designated. The test is Welch’s t-test with unequal variances (Moser 
and Stevens 1992; Ruxton 2006).30 
Table 11 presents the results of t tests for differences in means. The test examines 
whether the change in mean volatility for banks receiving government support or designated as 
G-SIBs is different from the change in mean volatility for banks that did not receive government 
support or were not designated as G-SIBs.31 This test has advantages and disadvantages 
compared to the regression results. It examines changes and therefore is not affected by 
constant differences across banks. On the other hand, this test is univariate and there is no 
control for other variables, an obvious disadvantage. In addition, the test uses changes in 
volatilities, which are likely to have more noise than levels.  
The tests are applied to the changes in mean volatilities for banks that received 
government support compared to banks that did not receive government support. This 
provides some control for the individual institutions’ levels of volatility and differences in volatility 
for different time periods. 
The data on government support provide little support for an effect of government 
support in 2008 and 2009 on subsequent volatility. The change in mean volatilities for 
                                                                          
29 These should be less of a problem for the G-SIB designation, as the FSB followed a methodology prepared by the 
BCBS which is based on a quantitative and qualitative assessment. As we commented in the description of  
the variables, the indicators used are based on five criteria: size, interconnectedness, availability (or not) of substitutes 
for the services they provide, global activity (cross-jurisdictional activity), and complexity.   
30 These tests provide additional evidence about the hypotheses. In the absence of completely exogenous changes in 
support and designations as G-SIBs which are randomly distributed across banks, the possibility of reverse causality 
cannot be eliminated. 
31 The test for government support deletes one bank that received a capital injection in 2010, not a major effect with 46 
observations. The test for G-SIBs includes only banks which are designated G-SIBs the entire period or are not 
designated G-SIBs during the entire period of analysis. As Table 1 indicates, including only banks that are G-SIBs the 
entire period is not restrictive. To eliminate effects of a changing sample, we run the test using only banks that exist 
from 2010 to 2014. 
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supported bank is smaller in 2010 and larger in 2011, both being statistically significant at the 5 
percent significance level or close to it (5.2 percent). The changes in later years are smaller in 
magnitude. At least through 2014, this provides little support for a relationship between 
government support and the volatility of banks’ stock returns. Given that the regressions for the 
entire period provided little support for an association between government support and 
volatility, we interpret this evidence as indicating that our data provide little support for such a 
relationship. 
The results for G-SIBs indicate that banks initially designated as G-SIBs had larger 
increases in volatility after their designation as G-SIBs. The statistical significance of this 
negative development is lessened in more recent years although it is not clear that the 
economic significance is lessened. From 2010 to 2011 (first year of designation as G SIBs),  
the difference in the change in volatility is the largest. These results are somewhat mixed 
concerning whether being designated a G-SIB is associated with a subsequent increase in the 
volatility of banks’ stock returns. On the other hand, the baseline regression for 2004 to 2014, 
which controls for other variables, shows a substantial relationship. We interpret the results in 
Table 11 as providing support for the results in the baseline regression and some support that 
the higher volatility is a result of the designation and not the reason for the designation.  
There certainly is little to no evidence that being designated a G-SIB is associated with 
a decrease in the volatility in bank’s stock returns. This result is in line with Sarin and Summers’ 
(2016) results. 
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7 Conclusions 
In the aftermath of the crisis, bank regulators agreed on safety and soundness requirements 
based on capital and liquidity requirements, which are not yet fully implemented. Furthermore, 
new prudential regulation focuses on structural aspects such as the systemic importance of 
banks, e.g., size and interconnectedness, and their securities trading activities including 
proprietary trading. Our paper analyses the implied effect on the realized volatility of banks´ daily 
stock returns of some of the most relevant new elements of the prudential regulatory framework 
agreed after the financial crisis yet to be fully implemented. We also analyze the association of 
banks’ realized volatility with designation as a G-SIB and with government capital injections. We 
use bank’s realized volatility of stock returns as our measure of banks’ ex post risk.  
Our results indicate that banks designated as G-SIBs have higher volatility and risk. 
The results of a test on the changes provides virtually no evidence that the volatilities of G-SIBs’ 
returns have fallen compared to other banks after their designations as G-SIBs. On the 
contrary, there is evidence they have increased. 
The estimates provide mixed evidence about whether government capital injections 
are associated with higher volatility of returns or there is no association. 
It is possible, of course, that the designations as G-SIBs and government capital 
injections are due to forecasts of higher volatility, and volatility would have been even higher 
without these government interventions. That is possible. It also is fair to say that there is no 
evidence in these data which supports the proposition that volatility is lower due to these 
interventions. As a referee noted, a natural experiment might sort this out. On the other hand, 
maybe not. A natural experiment would involve exogenous changes in support distributed 
across banks independent of the banks’ characteristics. Such an exogenous change is hard to 
imagine, but even so, such an exogenous change does not provide any evidence about a 
crucial aspect of the underlying issue: moral hazard, the effect of this support on banks’ 
subsequent behaviour because they place a higher probability on support in the future if they 
get into financial difficulty. Similarly, designations of G-SIBs are dependent on banks’ 
characteristics by construction. 
In our judgement, the association of volatility with banks’ leverage and liquidity is not 
as strong a guide to the effects of the regulations. The imposition of the leverage ratio and 
liquidity regulations may change the estimated coefficients in equations such as ours because 
the underlying source of the changes in variables is different with regulation. Even so, it seems 
to us that some evidence about proposed regulations is better than none. 
Banks with higher trading assets have higher volatility of stock returns. This result is 
consistent across all specifications and is in line with the empirical results of Myers and Rajan 
(1998) and Morgan (2002). 
The leverage ratio is negatively associated with ex post risk and the effect is not trivial. 
An increase in the capital leverage ratio decreases volatility, results which are in line with those 
of Kiema and Jokivuolle (2014). 
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Banks´ liquidity does not seem to have much relationship with realized volatility. The 
estimated association between volatility and stable funding is somewhat statistically significant, 
but the magnitudes of the coefficients are small. Given the important differences between the 
liquidity ratios used in our paper and the regulatory ratios, it is possible that the definitional issues 
are important. It also is possible that observed variation of liquidity is unimportant for risk. 
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Figure 1 
DENSITY OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE BANKS’ BETAS 
 
 
This figure shows the distribution of the estimated 's  for the banks. There are 881 banks 
with estimated 's  in the ranged -2 to 2. The bandwidth is a measure of the smoothing 
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Table 1 
G-SIBS DESIGNATED BY THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD FROM 2011 TO 2014 
Bank 
Year 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agricultural Bank of China Limited    X 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA  X X X 
Banco Santander SA X X X X 
Bank of America Corporation X X X X 
Bank of China Limited X X X X 
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation X X X X 
Barclays Plc X X X X 
BNP Paribas X X X X 
Citigroup Inc X X X X 
Commerzbank AG X    
Crédit Agricole S.A. X X X X 
Deutsche Bank AG X X X X 
Dexia X    
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc X X X X 
HSBC Holdings Plc X X X X 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China    X X 
ING Groep NV X X X X 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. X X X X 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc X    
Lloyds TSB Group Pl X    
Morgan Stanley X X X X 
Nordea Bank AB (publ) X X X X 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) X X X X 
Société Générale X X X X 
Standard Chartered Plc  X X X 
State Street Corporation X X X X 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc X X X X 
UBS AG X X X X 
UniCredit SpA X X X X 
Wells Fargo & Company X X X X 
SOURCE: Financial Stability Board, annual publications with various titles. Each “X” designates 
a year in which the bank was designated as a G-SIB by the Financial Stability Board. 
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Table 2 
HYPOTHESIZED EFFECT ON THE VOLATILITY OF BANKS’ STOCK RETURNS 
 
Form of government intervention Expected sign Explanation 
Government capital injection Uncertain 
(+) Markets perceive the subsidy as a revelation of 
potential unknown trouble 
(-) A confirmation on the bailout for the individual bank 
may reduce the perceived level of risk 
Designation as a G-SIB Uncertain 
(+) A G-SIB benefits from an implicit message that the 
bank is too big to fail and takes more risk 
(-1) A G-SIB is more closely regulated and assumes 
less risk 
Limitations on asset trading Negative 
(-) Reducing the extent to which banks can invest on 
their own account associated with lower risk 
Leverage ratio Positive (-) Higher leverage is associated with higher risk 
Liquidity regulation Uncertain 
(+) More liquid banks can engage in trading activities 
that are difficult to monitor (paradox of liquidity)  
(-) Higher liquidity reduces liquidity risk 
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Country /Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
AUSTRIA 8 9 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 93
BELGIUM 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 27
BOSNIA‐HERZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
BULGARIA 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 36
CHINA 0 1 5 6 8 8 11 11 12 13 10 85
CROATIA 9 12 13 14 12 10 8 13 12 11 9 123
CYPRUS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 31
CZECH REPUBL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
DENMARK 7 12 13 13 14 13 14 15 13 10 10 134
FINLAND 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 31
FRANCE 17 20 23 24 24 22 23 23 22 21 21 240
GERMANY 14 14 12 12 9 10 10 10 9 9 7 116
GREECE 7 8 13 12 12 12 12 4 3 5 5 93
HUNGARY 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 25
ICELAND 0 3 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
IRELAND 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 27
ITALY 14 23 30 26 24 25 24 24 23 22 20 255
JAPAN 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 11
LATVIA 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 11
LITHUANIA 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 30
LUXEMBOURG 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 21
MACEDONIA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 9
MALTA 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 19
MONTENEGRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4
NETHERLANDS 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 51
NORWAY 9 11 19 19 19 19 22 22 21 21 21 203
POLAND 11 11 13 14 15 15 14 15 15 15 14 152
PORTUGAL 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 4 5 4 49
ROMANIA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 33
RUSSIAN FEDER 3 5 5 7 8 8 11 12 13 10 10 92
SERBIA 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 1 1 9
SLOVAKIA 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 34
SLOVENIA 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 18
SPAIN 10 14 14 14 11 10 10 12 9 8 7 119
SWEDEN 3 5 6 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 49
SWITZERLAND 3 5 7 7 9 10 10 10 10 9 10 90
TURKEY 12 15 5 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 95
UKRAINE 0 0 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 3 22
UNITED KINGD 12 14 16 16 12 11 11 12 10 11 11 136
USA 282 312 315 297 271 300 278 269 260 240 210 3034
Total 456 535 573 557 519 545 528 519 500 472 426 5630
Table 3 
NUMBER OF BANKS BY COUNTRY AND YEAR 
 
This table shows the number of banks for each country and year. An observation is the 
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Table 4 





Banks’ realized volatility 0.026 0.034 7.7x10-10 1.368 
Government support 0.069 0.254 0 1 
G-SIB 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Trading assets 0.019 0.054 0 0.677 
Leverage ratio 9.630 6.579 0.102 83.358 
Liquidity coverage 22.197 51.508 0.010 992.080 
Stable funding 89.697 53.033 0.060 908.510 
Total Assets 1.1x108 3.7x108 6.8x103 3.8x109 
ROAA 0.657 1.892 -55.875 28.390 
|Beta| x Market’s realized volatility 0.013 0.199 3.9x10-6 14.881 
Real GDP Growth rate 1.797 2.713 -17.955 14.162 
Pre-crisis dummy variable 0.376 0.485 0 1 
Leverage ratio   3% 0.971 0.169 0 1 
 
There are 5630 observations for all variables. Banks’ realized volatility is the realized 
volatility of banks’ daily stock returns for six months after the announcement of banks’ income 
statements and balance sheets. Government support is a dummy variable that is one if a bank 
received a capital injection during the financial crisis and zero otherwise. G-SIB is a dummy 
variable that is one if a bank is classified as a G-SIB by the FSB in the corresponding year and 
zero otherwise. Trading assets are the ratio of trading securities to total assets as a 
percentage. The leverage ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets as a percentage. The liquidity 
coverage is the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding as a percentage. The 
stable funding is the ratio of deposits and net borrowing to loans. Total assets includes off-
balance sheet items. ROAA is the return on average assets as a percentage. |Beta| x Market’s 
realized volatility is the absolute value of the bank’s beta times the realized volatility of stock 
market returns in the major exchange in the country in which a bank’s headquarter is located. 
The real GDP growth rate is the real GDP growth rate in the country in which a bank’s 
headquarter is located. The pre-crisis dummy variable is a dummy variable equal to one for 
2004 to 2007 and zero otherwise. The variable Leverage ratio   3% is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a bank has a leverage ratio greater than or equal to 3 percentage points and equal to 
zero otherwise. 
The levels of these variables are presented in this table because summary statistics of 
the logarithms are less informative than summary statistics on the levels. The logarithms of 
variables other than dummy variables are used in all regressions. 
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Table 5 
































1            
Government 
support 
.027 1           
G-SIB -.008 .307 1          
Trading 
assets 
-.033 .091 .147 1         
Leverage 
ratio 
-.072 -.170 -.101 -.096 1        
Liquidity 
coverage 
-.009 .172 .166 .374 -.001 1       
Stable 
funding 
-.022 .078 .160 .253 .049 .393 1      
Total assets -.065 .374 .300 .251 -.358 .296 .193 1     





.138 .168 .082 .061 -.102 .190 .110 .420 -.045 1   
Real GDP 
growth rate 
-.099 -.165 -.010 .044 .054 .019 .026 .020 .256 -.067 1  
Leverage 
ratio   3% -.080 -.068 -.011 -.083 .488 -.102 -.144 -.181 .184 -.076 .052 1 
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Table 6 
UNIVARIATE REGRESSIONS FOR REALIZED VOLATILITY 2004 TO 2014 
 
Variable Coefficient Intercept 
Government support 0.130** -3.994*** 
G-SIB -0.079 -3.984*** 
Trading assets -0.859** 0.015 
Leverage ratio -0.174*** -3.614*** 
Liquidity coverage 0.009 -3.963*** 
Stable funding -0.055* -4.314*** 
Total Assets -0.0345*** -3.435*** 
ROAA -0.077*** -3.934*** 
|Beta| x Market’s realized volatility 0.135*** -3.297*** 
Real GDP growth rate -0.046*** -3.903*** 
Pre-crisis dummy variable -0.165*** -3.922*** 
Leverage ratio   3% -0.586*** -3.416* 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
This table presents univariate regressions of realized volatility on each of the right-
hand-side variables for 2004 to 2014. The note to Table 4 provides the definitions of the 
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Table 7 
DETERMINANTS OF RISK AT BANKS: 2004 TO 2014 
This table presents regressions of realized volatility on the set of variables considered. 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
The dependent variable in each regression is the standard deviation of banks’ daily 
stock returns for 6 months after the announcement of income statements and balance sheets. 
There are 5,630 observations in all regressions. All regressions include fixed effects for each 
bank and each year and use clustered standard errors. 
The note to Table 4 provides the definitions of the variables and the text provides 
















Government support 0.209 0.208 -7.175 0.243* 
G-SIB 0.327*** -0.401 0.338*** 0.342*** 
Trading assets 1.299** 1.293** 1.111** 2.245*** 
Leverage ratio -0.435*** -0.435*** -0.424*** -0.421*** 
Liquidity coverage 0.006 0.006 0.009 -0.053 
Stable funding -0.168 -0.166 -0.156 -0.232* 
Total assets 0.299 0.300 0.295 0.289 
ROAA -0.030* -0.030* -0.030* -0.032* 
|Beta| x Market’s realized volatility 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.342*** 0.289** 
Real GDP growth rate 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.007 
Leverage ratio  3% -0.277 -0.276 -0.262 -0.272 
     
G-SIB x Trading assets  -0.069   
G-SIB x Leverage ratio  -0.070   
G-SIB x Liquidity coverage  0.161   
G-SIB x Stable funding  -0.087   
     
Government support x Trading assets   1.588  
Government support x Leverage ratio   0.089  
Government support x Liquidity coverage   -0.080  
Government support x Stable funding   -0.102  
     
Pre-crisis dummy variable    0.112** 
Pre-crisis dummy x Trading assets    -2.141** 
Pre-crisis dummy x Leverage ratio    0.038 
Pre-crisis dummy x Liquidity coverage    0.115*** 
Pre-crisis dummy x Stable funding    0.107 
Adjusted R-squared  .157 .156 .157 .160 
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Table 8 
THE COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABLES INCLUDING THE INTERACTION TERMS  
AND TESTS WHETHER THE INTERACTION TERMS ARE STATISTICALLY 
SIGNIFICANT 2004 TO 2014 
 
Interaction terms with variables Coefficient p-value p-value for F-test on all 
coefficients 
G-SIB Dummy Variable 
.208 
Trading assets 1.224 .266 
Leverage ratio -0.366 .113 
Liquidity coverage 0.167 .273 
Stable funding  0.253 .046 
Government Support Dummy Variable 
.067 
Trading assets 2.699 .043 
Leverage ratio - 0.512 .018 
Liquidity coverage -0.071 .587 
Stable funding 0.258 .226 
Pre-crisis Dummy Variable 
.786 
Trading assets 0.104 .850 
Leverage ratio -0.459 .004 
Liquidity coverage 0.061 .035 
Stable funding 0.125 .215 
 
This table presents summary coefficients, tests whether the coefficients are zero and 
tests whether the respective dummy variables times this set of variables are statistically 
significantly different. The coefficients are the total coefficient for the observations in which the 
respective dummy variables are one. For example, the coefficient 1.224 for trading assets with 
the G-SIB dummy variable indicates that G-SIBs have a coefficient of 1.224 for trading assets. 
The p-value of 0.266 is the p-value for a test whether this coefficient is statistically significantly 
different than zero. The p-value for F-test is the p-value for a test whether the coefficients of all 
four variables are statistically significantly different than the coefficients in the baseline 
regression. This test has a p-value of 0.208, which indicates that the coefficients for GSIBs are 
not statistically significantly different. 
The note to Table 4 provides the definitions of the variables and the text provides 
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Table 9 
DETERMINANTS OF RISK AT BANKS: 2008 TO 2014 
 
Variable Baseline Regression 
Financial variables’ 
coefficients different  
for G-SIBs 
Financial variables’ 
coefficients different with 
government support 
Government support 0.568*** 0.576*** 6.655* 
G-SIB 0.065 12.105*** 0.116 
Trading assets 1.982*** 2.160*** 2.212*** 
Leverage ratio -0.423 - 0.417 - 0.429 
Liquidity coverage -0.001 -0.002 0.007 
Stable funding -0.323* -0.345* 0.360 
Total Assets 0.423 0.417 0.429 
ROAA -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
|Beta| x Market’s realized volatility -0.180 -0.185 -0.195 
Real GDP growth rate -0.034 -0.034 -0.031 
Leverage ratio   3% -0.027 -0.018 0.016 
    
G-SIB x Trading assets  -2.611***  
G-SIB x Leverage ratio  -0.050  
G-SIB x Liquidity coverage  0.051  
G-SIB x Stable funding  0.013  
    
Government support x Trading assets    -0.876 
Government support x Leverage ratio   - 0.408 
Government support x Liquidity coverage   -0.072 
Government support x Stable funding   -0.237 
Adjusted R-squared 0.143 0.142 0.143 
This table presents regressions of realized volatility on the set of variables considered. 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
The dependent variable in each regression is the standard deviation of banks’ daily 
stock returns for 6 months after the announcement of income statements and balance sheets. 
There are 5,630 observations in all regressions. All regressions include fixed effects for each 
bank and each year and use clustered standard errors. 
The note to Table 4 provides the definitions of the variables and the text provides 
additional information and the sources of the data. 
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Table 10 
THE COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABLES INCLUDING THE INTERACTION TERMS  
AND TESTS WHETHER THE INTERACTION TERMS ARE STATISTICALLY 
SIGNIFICANT 2008 TO 2014 
Interaction terms with variables  Coefficient p-value 
p-value for F-test on 
all coefficients 
G-SIB Dummy Variable  
Trading assets -0.451 .611 
.621 
Leverage ratio -0.366 .241 
Liquidity coverage 0.049 .772 
Stable funding 0.358 .114 
Government Support Dummy Variable  
Trading assets 1.336 .099 
.328 
Leverage ratio -0.679 .058 
Liquidity coverage -0.065 .649 
Stable funding 0.123 .329 
 
This table presents summary coefficients, tests whether the coefficients are zero and 
tests whether the respective dummy variables times this set of variables are statistically 
significantly different. The coefficients are the total coefficient for the observations in which the 
respective dummy variables are one. For example, the coefficient -0.451 for trading assets with 
the G-SIB dummy variable indicates that G-SIBs have a coefficient of -0.451 for trading assets. 
The p-value of 0.611 is the p-value for a test whether this coefficient is statistically significantly 
different than zero. The p-value for F-test is the p-value for a test whether the coefficients of all 
four variables are statistically significantly different than the coefficients in the baseline 
regression. This test has a p-value of 0.621, which indicates that the coefficients for GSIBs are 
not statistically significantly different. 
The note to Table 4 provides the definitions of the variables and the text provides 
additional information and the sources of the data. 
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Table 11 
TESTS FOR DIFFERENCES IN CHANGES IN VOLATILITY BETWEEN GSIBS AND NON-GSIBS 
AND BANKS WHICH RECEIVED GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND THOSE THAT DID NOT 
 








 Government Support 
 Received Government Support 
2010 -0.340 0.222 46 -0.075 -1.972 0.052 
2011 -0.023 0.340 46 0.128 2.259 0.027 
2012 -0.358 0.345 46 -0.002 -0.035 0.972 
2013 -0.500 0.380 46 0.085 -1.343 0.184 
2014 -0.360 0.761 46 0.124 0.925 0.358 
 Did not receive Government Support 
2010 -0.265 0.360 346    
2011 -0.151 0.491 346    
2012 -0.356 0.504 346    
2013 -0.415 0.548 346    
2014 -0.484 1.366 346    
 G-SIB 
 G-SIBs by 2010 
2011 0.371 0.199 22 0.243 5.121 <10-3 
2012 0.059 0.176 22 0.150 3.379 0.002 
2013 -0.201 0.139 22 -0.058 -1.501 0.140 
2014 -0.112 0.200 22 0.167 1.665 0.096 
 Not GSIBs 
2011 0.128 0.420 385    
2012 -0.091 0.463 385    
2013 -0.143 0.489 385    
2014 -0.278 1.776 385    
 
This table presents tests of mean changes in volatility for banks that received 
government support in 2008 or 2009 and existed from 2009 to 2014. The test for Government 
Support is a test of differences in the changes in the realized volatility from 2009 to the year 
indicated. 
The t-statistic is the t-statistic from Welch’s t-test with unequal variances (Moser and 
Stevens 1992; Ruxton 2006). 
This table also presents tests of mean changes in volatility for banks designated as G-
SIBs which existed from 2010 through 2014. The test compares banks designated as GSIBs in 
2010 which remained GSIBs through 2014 and banks not designated as GSIBs in 2010 which 
were not designated as GSIBs. Hence the test for G-SIBs is a test of differences in the 
changes in volatility from 2010 to the year indicated. 
The fourth column with statistics is the change of volatility for banks receiving 
government or designated G-SIBs minus the change in volatility for banks not receiving 
government support or designated G-SIBs. The last two columns present the Welch t-test 
statistic with unequal variances (Moser and Stevens 1992; Ruxton 2006) and the p-value for 
the test. 
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